CongoSky
LightWeb
Strong privacy for ordinary people — from advertisers, data brokers, and casual surveillance — built so that abuse is preventable and provable. The opposite of a no-rules darknet. Pedophile-free, trafficking-free: safety by architecture, not by hope.
● The demo's addressing + blocking run in your browser — no server, no plaintext store
The honest tradeoff (read this first)
See it: a relay blocks known-bad without decrypting
Published content gets an address that's a deterministic fingerprint of the content (convergent encryption). A relay matches that address against a known-bad denylist (an NCMEC-style hash set) — and refuses it without ever holding a key or seeing the words. Try a normal post, then the simulated known-bad item.
Safety by architecture
- Vouched, revocable membership (web-of-trust) — no anonymous throwaway flood.
- Non-repudiable authorship — every object is signed; publishing isn't anonymous, and it's revocable.
- Block known-bad without surveillance — relays match content addresses, never decrypt legitimate traffic.
- Tamper-evident moderation — report → confirm → denylist → revoke, on a hash-linked trail.
- Private 1:1 messages stay ordinary random-key end-to-end — not relay-scanned; abuse there is handled on-device by Qapha.
The honest limits (loud)
Exact-address blocking catches known bad content only — one changed pixel changes the address and evades it. Real prevention needs perceptual hashing (PhotoDNA-style) + human review + NCMEC reporting — named as roadmap, not claimed. This reduces and exposes abuse; it does not end it. Strong, lawful privacy for ordinary people is the goal; shielding predators is explicitly not. the proof ↗